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1.   Introduction
Distributed systems pose reliability problems not frequently encountered in more
traditional ’centralised’ systems.  A distributed system consisting of a number of computers
(nodes) connected by some communication network is subject to independent failure modes of its
components, such as nodes, links and operating systems.  The lack of any centralised control can
mean that part of the system can fail with other parts still functioning, thus leading to the
possibility of abnormal behaviour of application programs in execution.  We will consider a
distributed system where the nodes provide various services (e.g. data storage, printing) which
can be invoked by an application program.  Such a program will be termed a distributed program
whose execution will require a group of cooperating processes distributed over the system.  It is
natural to require that such a group of processes behave ’consistently’ in the presence of failures.
A very simple consistency requirement, expressed in terms of the behaviour of a distributed
program, is that of failure atomicity: the program either terminates normally, producing the
intended results, or is ’aborted’, producing no results at all.
Ideally we would like programs to terminate normally in the presence of an arbitrarily large
number of failures, but this may require so much redundancy in the system as to make it
economically unattractive.  Assume that a distributed program is subject to two kinds of failures:
(i) transmission failures such as lost messages (a message sent by a process does not reach its
destination); and (ii) node crashes (a node stops functioning).  We can then state the following
range of reliability requirements for a distributed program.
(1) A program will terminate normally despite the occurrence of a (fixed) finite number of
transmission failures (but node crashes cause abortion as stated earlier).
(2) A program will terminate normally despite the occurrence of a (fixed) finite  number of
transmission failures and node crashes.
In either case, if the limitation on the number of transmission failures or node crashes is
exceeded, the program is aborted.  The two types of requirements listed above represent a range
from fairly to most reliable. Indeed, a very appealing technique for constructing type (2)
programs is to build them out of type (1) programs.  In this paper we will concentrate mainly on
programs of type (1), which can be regarded as the basic building blocks of a software system, and
then briefly discuss how the other type of program can be constructed.
So far we have discussed tolerance only to specified types of faults.  If tolerance to
unforeseen faults, such as software design faults, is required, then type (1) or type (2) programs
can be used, say, as alternates in a recovery block [Horning et al. 74].  A recovery block is a special
construct consisting of an acceptance test and a series of alternates.  A computation executes the
first alternate and checks the result by evaluating the acceptance test.  If the test fails, the next
alternate is executed, after performing state restoration, and the acceptance test evaluated again.
A discussion on design fault tolerance is beyond the scope of this paper, but the interested reader
is referred to [Lee and Anderson 85] for more details.
Having indicated the scope of the problem to be solved, let us investigate some structural
properties of a distributed program.  Most modern programming languages (e.g. C++ [Stroustrup
86]) support the facility of data abstraction, enabling a programmer to associate a set of
operations with data structures.  The term abstract objects (or objects, for short) will be used to
refer to instances of data abstractions.  Abstract objects are structured entities that can only be
manipulated by invoking the procedures associated with them.  Programs constructed using
abstract objects have a hierarchical structure in that higher level objects are constructed using
– 3 –
lower level objects: making such a program reliable essentially involves making objects reliable
(that is ensuring that objects remain consistent in the presence of failures of certain kinds).  It is
natural to assume that distributed programs will have a similar structure to that discussed above,
the only difference being that objects may be distributed over the network.  All that is then
necessary is to provide network protocols enabling a program to invoke operations of a remote
object.  Such a protocol should  provide the abstraction of invoking a procedure.  Hence the term
remote procedure call (RPC) is often used to refer to the services provided by the protocol.  Our
task is thus to investigate reliability techniques for constructing reliable distributed programs of
type (1) and (2), which in turn implies investigating reliability techniques for robust objects
whose operations can be invoked by making use of RPCs.  We begin by investigating the notion of
atomic actions.
2.   Atomic Actions
We will assume that objects can be shared between various programs.  It is then necessary to
ensure that concurrent executions of programs be free from interference, i.e. concurrent
executions should be equivalent to some serial order of execution [Eswaran et al. 76, Best and
Randell 81].  To understand this, consider the following two programs (where w, x, y and z are
distinct variables):
P1: z := 10; x := x+1; y := y+1
P2: w := 7: x := x * 2; y := y * 2
Assume that x=y=2 initially.  Then, a serial execution order ’P1;P2’ will produce the result z=10,
w=7, x=y=6, and execution ’P2;P1’ will produce the results z=10, w=7, x=y=5.  The partly
concurrent execution order given below
(z := 10 || w := 7); x := x+1; y := y+1; x := x * 2; y := y * 2
will be termed interference free or serialisable, since it is equivalent to the serial order ’P1;P2’.
However, an execution order such as
(z := 10 || w := 7); x := x+1; x := x * 2; y := y * 2; y := y+1
is not free from interference since it cannot be shown to be equivalent to any serial order.
Programs that possess the above mentioned ’serialisable’ property are said to be atomic with
respect to concurrency (or simply atomic), and the computations that are invoked by these
programs are termed atomic actions.  We will embellish such programs with the failure atomicity
property mentioned earlier, thus ensuring that any computation progresses without interference
from other computations and at the same time either terminates normally (producing intended
results) or is aborted (terminated without producing any results).  It is reasonable to assume that
once a computation terminates normally, the results produced are not destroyed by subsequent
failures (node crashes).  Hence, we will also require that an atomic action be enriched with the
permanence of effect property (i.e. the state changes produced should be stable or durable, with a
high probability of surviving node crashes).  An atomic action with the failure atomicity and
permanence of effect properties will be termed a robust atomic action.  In view of the discussion
presented in the preceding  section, we will investigate in subsequent sections the fault tolerance
techniques that should be employed to support robust atomic actions and objects.  We will begin
this investigation by first considering local (non–distributed) computations and then discuss what
extensions, if any, are required to support distributed computations.
We conclude this section by briefly dwelling on the topic of concurrency control for atomic
actions.  This subject has been, and continues to be, intensely researched [Bernstein and
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Goodman 81], and although the research has been largely confined to database systems, the
techniques proposed are applicable to other areas.  A very simple and widely used approach is to
regard all operations on objects to be of type ’read’ or ’write’, which must follow the well known
synchronisation rule permitting ’concurrent reads but exclusive writes’.  This rule is imposed by
requiring that any computation intending to perform an operation that is of type read (write) on an
object, must first acquire a ’read lock’ (’write lock’) associated with that object.  A read lock on an
object can be held concurrently by many computations provided no computation is holding a
write lock on that object.  A write lock on an object, on the other hand, can only be held by a
computation provided no other computation is holding a read or a write lock.  In a classic paper
[Eswaran et al. 76], Eswaran et al. proved that all computations must follow a ’two–phase’
locking policy (see Fig. 1) to ensure the atomicity property (i.e. lack of interference).
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During the first phase, termed the growing phase, a computation can acquire locks, but not
release them.  The tail end of the computation constitutes the shrinking phase, during which time
held locks can be released but no locks can be acquired.  Now suppose that a computation in its
shrinking phase is to be aborted, and that some objects with write locks have already been
released.  If some of these objects have been locked by other computations, then abortion of the
computation will require these computations to be aborted as well.  To avoid this cascade roll
back problem, it is necessary to make the shrinking phase ’instantaneous’, as shown by the dotted
lines.  In effect this means that all the held locks are released simultaneously.  For the sake of
simplicity, in the rest of the paper we will assume that some concurrency control technique, such
as two–phase locking, is being employed and, further, that there is no danger of cascade roll back.
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3.   Fault Models and Exception Handling
We assume that the communication system connecting all the nodes is faulty, as are the
nodes themselves.  Communication system faults are modelled as being responsible for the
following types of failures;
(i) a message sent by a node does not reach its destination;
(ii) a message can get corrupted during its passage;
(iii) messages can arrive out of order at a destination;
(iv) a message can get replicated during its passage.
We will assume that there is sufficient redundancy in a message (e.g. a checksum) to enable
a receiver to detect corrupted messages with a very high probability of success.  Thus, we need
only concern ourselves with failures of types (i), (iii) and (iv).  It will be the responsibility of the
underlying RPC protocol to cope with these failures and to signal exceptions when failures cannot
be masked (see section 5.2 for more on Remote Procedure Calls).
We will model node faults in a very simple manner.  We assume that a node either works
perfectly or it simply stops working (crashes).  After a crash, the node is repaired within a finite
amount of time and made active again.  A node can have two types of storage facilities: stable
(crash proof) storage, and non–stable (volatile) storage.  All the data stored on non–stable storage
is lost when a crash happens.  All the data stored on stable storage, on the other hand, remains
unaffected by a crash.
The reader may perhaps find our model of a faulty node less realistic than that of the
communication system.  The problem is that a malfunctioning node can be capable of arbitrary
behaviour (and not just remaining silent as assumed here).  Designing systems under an arbitrary
failure mode assumption is an extremely difficult task and is not within the scope of this paper
(but see [Lamport et al. 82] for further reading).  If we assume that a malfunctioning node is
quickly ’shut down’ by some external agency, then our model can be said to approximate reality.
Alternatively, or in addition, it is also possible to introduce enough redundancy in a node for its
behaviour to approximate more closely to that of the model.
We will adopt the exception handling strategy proposed in [Cristian 82].  We will say that an
invocation of a procedure either completes successfully (a normal return is obtained) or
abnormally (a specified exceptional return is obtained).  Let C be a procedure that can signal two
exceptions e1 and e2; then, we will adopt the following notation to indicate this fact:
procedure C(...) signals e1, e2;
begin
...
assert B<fail: ... ; signal e1>;
...
D(...)<p1: ... ; signal  e2>;
...
end<fail: ... ; signal fail>;
The body of the procedure also illustrates several further points: (i) angular brackets enclose
exception handlers; (ii) a default ’fail’ exception is generated if the Boolean expression of the
assert command evaluates to false; (iii) the handler for exception p1 causes C to signal e2; (iv)
every procedure can signal a fail exception.  The invoker of C can provide specific handlers for e1,
e2 and fail:
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C(...)<e1:H1 | e2: H2 | fail: H3>;
where vertical bars separate handlers.  The handler for a fail exception is intended to cope with the
fail exception and all other exceptions generated for which no specific handler is available:
C(...)<fail: H>;
In this case H will ’catch’ e1 or e2 or a fail exception.
4.   Robust Non–Distributed Programs
4.1   Recovery Semantics
In this subsection we will present principles of backward error recovery.  For the sake of
simplicity, only local computations (non–distributed) will be considered.  Using the terminology
and concepts developed for an earlier paper [Anderson et al. 78], for a computation or a process to
have the abstraction of backward error recovery (henceforth termed recovery) requires the
provision of the following three primitives:
(1) Establish a recovery point.  A process can establish a recovery point (erp), thus indicating
the start of a new recovery region (see Fig. 2).  This implies that, if necessary, the states of
any recoverable objects modified in that region can be restored automatically to those at the
start of the region.
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(2) Discard a recovery point.  A process can discard a previously established recovery point by
invoking the operation drp, thus indicating the end of a recovery region.
(3) Restore.  This operation invokes (backward) recovery.
By definition, a recoverable object is an object with the property that if its operations are
invoked from within a recovery region, then the invocation of recovery will see the object
automatically restored to its abstract state prevailing at the start of the recovery region.  Of course,
this also means that if a recoverable object is modified from outside a recovery region, then no
automatic recovery capability will be available.
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Let A be a recoverable object.  From Fig. 2 we note that a number of operations have been
performed on A.  Suppose the flow of control has reached the point shown by the dotted arrow
when recovery is invoked.  How is object A restored?  There can be several ways recovery can be
mechanised.  Here are two examples:
(1) When the executing process enters a recovery region, the current state of the object is
recorded on some data structure (a checkpoint is taken).  Recovery then involves the
substitution of the recorded state for the current state.  (In general, a ’reverse’ procedure is
required to perform recovery [Shrivastava and Banâtre 78]).
(2) Enough information is recorded about the operations performed since the recovery region
was entered so as to be able to sequentially ’undo’, in reverse order,  all these operations.
The recovery cache algorithm for recovery blocks employs an optimised version of the first
approach.  We will assume a similar approach in the following discussion (see the next
subsection).
As an example of the usage of these primitives, consider the following program, where S is
any command.
erp;
start: S<fail: restore;  goto start>
drp;
What will happen if an exception is detected during the execution of S?  (S is retried.)
It is possible for recovery regions to be nested, as exemplified by, say, nested recovery
blocks, but for the sake of simplicity we shall not consider nested recovery regions further.  It is
important, however, to understand what nesting of recovery regions implies.  Consider the
following recovery block program:
R1: ensure at1 by A.op(...) else–by B.op(...) else fail;
where A and B are two abstract recoverable objects, and the notation ’A.op(  )’ indicates the
procedure ’op’ exported by object A.  Suppose that the body of this procedure contains a recovery
block:
procedure op(...)
begin
R2: ensure at2 by S1 else–by  S2 else fail;
end
We ask the question: is R2 nested within R1?  Irrespective of what the answer is, the semantics of
program R1 remain the same: if the test at1 fails, the states of objects A and B will remain
unchanged.  The mechanisation of recovery required to support the above semantics will,
however, crucially depend on whether R2 is regarded as nested within R1.  These issues are
discussed at length in the paper already cited [Anderson et al. 78].  Here we will adopt the view
that R1 and R2 represent recovery regions at two different levels of abstraction; hence they are not
nested (are disjoint).  The program given below, on the other hand, does contain nested recovery
regions.
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R3: ensure at1 by
ensure at2 by S1 else–by S2 else fail
else–by...
4.2   Nested Atomic Actions and Robust Objects
Let us ignore for the moment any issues concerning recovery and consider actions that are
atomic with respect to concurrency.  We will use the notation ’action S end’ to indicate that the
execution of S will be atomic.  Let A and B be two abstract objects:
A1: action ...; A.op(...); ... ; B.op(...); ... end
We will adopt the view that any action, such as A1, is composed out of smaller actions (which are
themselves composed out of yet smaller actions, and so on).  This is illustrated in Fig. 3, which
depicts the structure of the computation invoked by A1, and indicates that the execution of
program A1 gives rise to a computation with nested atomic action structure.  Note that in program
A1, the nesting of actions is implicit.  If we permit concurrency within an action, then nesting of
actions has to be indicated explicitly:
A1
A.op B.op
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A2: action
...
cobegin
A3: action ... end
A4: action ... end
coend
...
end
In the above program, concurrent actions (A3 and A4) are nested within A2.  In this paper we
will primarily consider sequential programs.  Nested concurrent actions provide a convenient
means of constructing type (2) programs, as we shall see in section 5.4.
Any concurrency control technique employed must ensure that the execution of the entire
program (e.g. A1) is free from interference.  So, if two–phase locking is being utilised, then all the
locks (including those acquired by internal actions such as A.op(...)) must be held till the
outermost action terminates, so as to avoid the danger of a cascade roll back [Moss 82].
Atomic actions provide a natural structure for introducing recoverability.  We will now
investigate the possibility of introducing failure atomicity and permanence of effect properties to
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obtain robust actions.  We will assume that outermost atomic actions are to be embellished in this
manner.  Let Ci be the stable (crash resistant) state of a system (i.e. Ci is the aggregation of stable
states of objects).  Then the function of a robust atomic action (with write operations) is to change
the state Ci to some new stable state Ci+1.  Assuming that ’r–action S end’ represents a robust
action, we can visualise the implementation of ’r–action’ and ’end’ as depicted below (two–phase
locking is assumed):
r–action → erp → record start of a recovery region;
end → drp → record new state on stable storage;
release locks;
We assume the existence of a stable storage object that is used for storing state information
of other objects.  The exact details of how the recovery region data are managed need not concern
us here but we will nevertheless briefly explain the basic principles involved.
To start with we will assume that every (recoverable) object is responsible for performing
its own recovery.  Assume that A1 (Fig. 3) is a robust action and some process P is executing it.
Then the table given below summarises the recovery aspects.  We assume that a data structure,
referred to as the P–list, is created for the executing process to record recovery data, which
includes the names of recoverable objects accessed so far and information regarding the locks
acquired.
Operation Actions of process P
erp create a data structure for recording recovery data; (call
this ’P–list’)
A.op() if lock on A is not held then lock A;
if name ’A’ is not recorded in P–list then make an entry;
call A.op( );
restore for all object names recorded in P–list do: call
objectname.recover;
drp for all object names recorded in P–list do: call
objectname.securestate;
release locks on all objects whose names are in P–list;
delete P–list.
We assume that every recoverable object provides a ’recover’ procedure, the function of
which is to adjust the internal variables of the object so that the abstract state of the object is
restored to that at the start of the recovery region.  In the simplest case, this will consist of
reinitialising the objects to their latest stable states.  Thus, whenever recovery is desired, process P
executes ’restore’ – this has the effect of restoring all the called objects to their stable states.
Finally, when discarding the recovery point of A1, we must ensure that a new stable state has been
created by invoking the ’securestate’ operation of all the objects recorded in the P–list so that each
object can store its new state on stable storage.  To summarise, a recoverable object has two
special operations:
recover: restore the state of the object;
securestate: record the current object state on stable storage.
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We can also add a third operation for coping with crashes; so crash recovery of a node
involves calling the crash–recover operations of all the objects:
crash–recover: reinitialise the object to the current stable state.
Consider now the particular scenario depicted in Fig. 4, where A1 is an outermost robust
action.  Suppose that objects A and B are recoverable.  Assume that the operation currently in
execution (B.op2) terminates by signalling a fail exception and this calls for recovery of A1.  The
backward recovery of A1 will involve restoring objects A and B, and as we have seen, this is
performed by automatically invoking the ’recover’ operations of these two objects. So, a single
call to ’A.recover’ will undo state changes introduced by the two atomic actions (A.op1, A.op2).
This illustrates a point not widely appreciated, and that is that recovery of an action (such as A1)
need not involve individually recovering constituent atomic actions.  It is certainly possible to
adopt a recovery model in which recovery of an action is performed by recovering constituent
actions (e.g. [Moss 82, Liskov and Scheifler 83]), i.e. recovery is performed on a call by call basis.
However, we consider that the recovery model presented here is a more elegant way of
mechanising object based recovery.  Similarly, in order to make the state changes produced by A1
stable, it is not necessary that the state changes produced by each constituent action be made
stable individually; rather, at the termination time all the recoverable objects used within A1 are
asked to make their current states stable (see the table of recovery actions above).
A1
A.op1 B.op1 A.op2 B.op2
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As a consequence of the above observations, internal actions have no need for stable
storage.  In particular, if an operation such as B.op1 has recovery regions (the body of op1, for
example, uses recovery blocks) then upon termination, all the recovery data can be simply
discarded.  The details of managing recovery data at different levels of abstraction are somewhat
involved and the reader is referred to [Shrivastava 81] for further details.
4.3   A Second Look At Crash Resistance
The framework for recovery presented above has one flaw which can be exposed by
considering the following situation: a node crash occurs during the execution of the operation
’drp’ of atomic action A1.  Suppose object A has been secured to the new stable state but the same
is not true for object B.  Thus, after recovering from the crash, while object A will be in the new
state, object B will be in the original state – an inconsistency.  What is necessary is for the crash
recovery algorithm of the node to somehow or other either restore A to the prior stable state or to
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bring B to the new stable state.  Since the second option is not possible, we require that A be
restored to the prior stable state.  This suggests that the algorithm for ’drp’ (for an outermost
robust atomic action) be modified in such a manner that normal termination is performed only
when all objects have made their states stable.  The algorithm given below ensures this.
The commit algorithm
”implementation of drp”
save process–state (cr); fate:=abort;
[put ’process–state’, ’fate’ and ’P–list’ on stable storage];
for all object names in P–list do
objectname. securestate;
[fate:=commit];
cr: case fate of
abort: for all object names in P–list do
{objectname.recover; release lock}
commit:  for all object names in P–list do
{objectname.commit; release lock}
end ”case”
die ”delete the process and the P–list”
Employing the terminology widely used, the termination of an action with the new state
made stable will be referred to as committing the action, and the algorithm that determines
whether an action is to be aborted or committed will be called the commit algorithm.  The
primitive drp (for an outermost robust action) implements the commit algorithm.  We introduce a
new operation for recoverable objects: ’commit’ whose function is to make the most recent
secured state the current state of the object.  The operation ’securestate’ is modified so that the
object merely records the most recent object state on stable storage (which is not made the current
state until the commit operation is executed).  We assume that associated with the executing
process, there is a variable named ’fate’ which records the fate of the action (to be aborted or
committed).
Looking at the algorithm, the process saves its state, ready to execute from label ’cr’ and the
variable ’fate’ is initialised to the value ’abort’.  A crash of the node at this point will result in the
abortion of the action since all the objects will have been restored to the previous committed
states, the recent states being discarded with locks released; at the same time, no state information
about the process survives the crash.  If there is no crash, the process executes the operations
enclosed by brackets and makes itself crash proof (held locks also become stable).  The execution
of this set of operations itself must be failure atomic (this is indicated by the brackets), so that
either all of the data regarding the process becomes stable or none is.  Construction of stable
storage which provides atomic update facilities is an interesting design exercise (see [Lampson
and Sturgis 81] for details).  The fate of the process is changed to commit only when all the objects
have secured their states.  If a crash occurs during this process (some of the objects have yet to
make their states stable), then after crash recovery the crashed process will be recreated, ready to
execute the commit algorithm from point ’cr’.  As can be seen, in this case all the objects will be
restored.  The operations ’recover’, ’commit’ and ’release a lock’ must be idempotent – multiple
executions are the same as a single execution. (Do you see why?  Consider what will happen if a
crash occurs during the execution of the case statement.  So, we must ensure that several
executions of the case statement are equivalent to a single one.)
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5.   Robust Distributed Programs
Our next task is to extend the ideas developed in the previous section to distributed
programs.  We will do this in three stages.  In the first subsection we will discuss a model of
distributed computation, and follow this up with a discussion on issues concerned with design and
use of remote procedure calls.  In the last subsection we will discuss recoverability and
commitment issues.
5.1   A Model of Distributed Computation
It was stated earlier that a distributed program will be executed by a group of processes.
There can be several ways of structuring such a group.  Here are three examples: (i) a new process
is created to serve each remote call; (ii) each object manager has a few (internal) server processes
that receive remote requests; (iii) a local process creates a server process on a remote node to
execute all the calls directed at that node.  We will adopt the last technique for our purposes,
because it represents a very simple way of extending a non–distributed computation to a
distributed one (the approach adopted in the Argus system [Liskov and Scheifler 83] roughly
corresponds to the first case).
Consider the following example: a distributed program makes use of three objects A (on the
local node N1), B (on node N2) and C (on node N3);  further, object B itself accesses some object D
on node N1.  In Fig. 5, we have shown the program and the corresponding process structure.  It is
assumed that primitives ’rpc(workername, procedurename, ...)’ and ’createworker(nodename,
...)’ are available for invoking remote procedures and creating processes  on remote nodes.  The
process executing this program creates a server process at a node before forwarding call requests
to it.  Thus process P will explicitly create processes W1 and W2.  Object B is responsible for
creating process W3 at N1 so that calls on object D can be made.  We thus see that the execution of
a distributed program can give rise to a hierarchy of processes.
This model of computation provides a straightforward means of incorporating the recovery
and crash resistance properties discussed previously.  So, for example, backward recovery
involves each process calling the ’recover’ operations of the objects it has directly manipulated:
process P will invoke A.recover and also send ’restore’ requests to processes W1 and W2.  We will
discuss these features in the section on Recovery and Crash Resistance.
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createworker (N3,...);
”returns W1 as the name of
the created process”
rpc (W1, C.op1, ...);
createworker (N2, ...);
rpc (W2, B.op1, ...);
A.op1(...);
rpc (W2, B.op2, ...);
(a) A Distributed Program
Master
P at N1
W1 at
N3
W2 at N2
W3 at N1
(b) Process Structure
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5.2   Remote Procedure Calls
In this subsection we will briefly examine remote procedure calls, whereby a client process
(such as W2, Fig. 5) can invoke an operation of a server or worker process (such as W3, Fig. 5).
Essentially, in this scheme a client’s remote call is transformed into a request message to the
named server who performs the requested work and sends the results back:
– 14 –

 		

 
	   fffi
	flffi  !"
#$ !"

  
	  % & ffi' ff

Both the client and server will contain measures for dealing with failures such as lost messages.
The design and implementation of remote procedure calls continues to be a subject of ongoing
research, and the reader’s attention is drawn to [Birrell and Nelson 84, Hamilton 84, Panzieri and
Shrivastava].  RPC protocols, in common with other types of protocol, typically employ time–out
mechanisms to prevent indefinite (or long) waiting by a process expecting a message.  Suppose
that a server crashes in the middle of a call, in which case the client will not receive the result
message and will eventually be ’timed out’.  It is interesting to note that a time–out exception
could indicate any of the following four possibilities: (a) the server crashed during the call; (b) the
server did not receive the request (the client’s call message got lost); (c) the server’s reply did not
reach the client; (d) the server is still performing the work (so the time–out interval was not long
enough).  We will assume that the client’s time–out results in the call terminating abnormally with
a fail exception.  For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that this is the only exception a remote
call can get.
rpc (servername, procname, params)<fail: handler>;
We will assume the following semantics for the RPC: if the call terminates normally (no fail
exception is generated) then exactly one execution for the call has taken place at the server; on the
other hand, if the fail exception is generated then it is not known whether the server has performed
the work.  This will be termed exactly once semantics.  What actions should be taken by the
handler associated with ’fail’? A reasonable strategy is to retry the call a few times:
rpc (...)<fail: retry(n)<fail: handler>>;
The above notation indicates that the call is retried a maximum of n times.  If the call
succeeds, then as before we require that only one execution has been performed at the server.  If all
the retries fail then one possibility, assuming the call has been made from within a recovery
region, is to invoke backward recovery:
rpc (...)<fail: retry(n)<fail: restore>>;
The implementation of ’restore’ in a distributed environment will be discussed in the next
subsection.  It is also possible to select a ’stronger’ semantics for RPCs, termed at most once: if a
call fails then no side effects will have been produced.  This requires the capability of undoing side
effects of individual calls; not surprisingly, this call semantics has been chosen by the advocates
of the ’call by call’ recovery model [Liskov and Scheifler 83, Svobodova 84].  As can be
appreciated, one advantage of this approach is that, when a call fails, it is not necessary to recover
the enclosing action (or more precisely, to the nearest recovery point) as is the case with the model
adopted here.
With the exception handling strategy just mentioned in mind, a simple technique exists for
creating a worker at a remote node:
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procedure createworker (Ni, ... )
begin
...
rpc (manager at Ni, create, params)
<fail: retry (n)<fail: signal fail>>;
end
This assumes that every node has a manager process that accepts calls for worker creation.
The created worker enters the cycle for receiving calls (see the simplified RPC protocol at the
beginning of this subsection) and sets a time out (the idle period).  If the client’s createworker call
fails and a worker nevertheless is created, then this worker will never receive a request for work.
hence its time out will expire and the associated handler can simply kill the worker. (Modification
to this strategy is required if the worker has become stable – as we shall see later.)
5.3   Recovery and Crash Resistance
We will now extend the recovery model of the previous section so that: (i) if a process
within the hierarchy of processes executes a ’restore’ operation, then it and its siblings all perform
backward recovery; (ii) commitment by the master process involves commitment by its siblings
(which in turn will involve commitment of their siblings and so forth).  We will consider all the
five operations (erp, local call, rpc, restore, drp) and see what recovery management is implied.
(1) Operation erp.  The executing process creates a data structure (P–list) to record recovery
data.
(2) Local call to an object.  If the object name is not on the P–list, then make an entry before the
call.
(3) Remote call.  If the name of the worker process is not on the P–list, then make an entry
before making the call.  The worker process will execute the call as a local call, i.e. the name
of the object will be recorded in the P–list of the worker.
(4) Operation restore.  The process performs the following operations: calls
objectname.recover operations of all the local objects recorded in the P–list; sends restore
commands to all the workers whose names are in the P–list.  If a remote call fails then the
process destroys itself (the outermost atomic action will eventually be aborted).
(5) Operation drp.  The commit algorithm (for the outermost atomic action) to be executed by
the master process, such as that shown in Fig. 5 is modified as shown below:
The commit algorithm of the master process
”implementation of drp”
save process–state(cr); fate:=abort;
[put ’process–state’, ’fate’ and ’P–list’ on stable storage];
for all local object in P–list do
objectname.securestate;
for all process names in P–list do
rpc (processname, stable, . . .)<fail: retry(n)
<fail: for all local object
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    names in P–list do
    {objectname.recover;
      release lock}; die>>;
[fate:=commit];
cr: case fate of
abort:     for all local object names in P–list do
{objectname.recover; release locks}
commit: for all local object names in P–list do
{objectname.commit; release lock}
                 for all process names in P–list do
rpc(. . .,commit,. . .)
”retry till success”
end ”case”
die;
Comparing with the original commit algorithm, we notice a few differences.  The process
secures local objects first then sends a ’stable’ command to all the workers.  This is a signal for a
worker to make itself and its objects stable.  If a remote call fails (after a few retries) then the
master process performs local recovery and dies.  We thus make it the responsibility of the
workers to determine when to abort.  A skeleton algorithm for a worker – modified from that
given at the beginning of the section on Remote Procedure Calls – is given below:
Life of a worker
fate:=abort; create an empty P–list;
cycle
cr: get–work(. . .) ”receive an rpc request with an idle time out”
<fail: case fate of
abort:  {restore local objects; die;}
heldup:  checkifmasterup(. . .);
      if up then goto cr else
{restore local objects; die}
   end ”case fate”>
analyse–request;
case command of
restore: ”see the description of command restore at the beginning of this
sub–section”
stable: save process–state(cr)
[put ’process–state’, ’fate’, ’P–list’ on stable storage];
for all local object names in P–list do
objectname.securestate;
for all process names in P–list do
rpc (processname, stable,. . .)
<fail: retry(n) <fail:restore local
objects; die>>;
result:=done;
[fate:=heldup]
call:  if lock on the named object not held then lock
the object;
if name not in P–list then make an
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entry; execute the call; prepare results;
commit: ”similar to the master”; result:=done;
end ”case command”;
send–results (. . .);
end ”cycle”
A worker waits for requests, with an ’idle time–out’.  If the time out expires (a fail exception
is generated) and fate=abort, then the worker aborts, suspecting a crash of its master.  On the other
hand, if the fate is ’heldup’ then the worker cannot abort unilaterally, and must check if its master
has aborted.  For this purpose, we assume the existence of a procedure ’checkifmasterup (...)’
which returns true if the called node has the named process running and false otherwise.  Looking
at Fig. 5, when process P executes ’drp’, the operation will terminate successfully only if P, W1,
W2 and W3 all commit their objects.
The commit algorithm presented here is known as the two–phase commit algorithm [Gray
78].  There are several ways of optimising this algorithm, some of which are discussed in [Mohan
and Lindsay 83].
5.4   Another Look At Crash Resistance
Robust actions described in the section on non–distributed programs have the property that
a crash of the node causes all the actions in progress to be aborted (except those that are
commiting).  Their distributed counterparts have a similar property in that a crash of any node
belonging to the group of processes executing an action causes the abortion of that action.  We will
discuss how such type (1) programs can be utilised for constructing type (2) programs, so that a
computation can complete normally despite crashes.  This is an attractive proposition for a
distributed program if a distributed system contains redundancy in the form of services provided.
Assume that we wish to construct a program to run on node N1 that calls operations of some
recoverable object, A, on node N2, and that there is another object, B, on node N3 which provides
similar operations to A.  We require the property that if N2 crashes in the middle of the
computation in question (or becomes unavailable from N1 due to some communications
breakdown), then rather than aborting the whole computation, only the side effects produced on A
should be undone and the computation continue by accessing object B instead of A.  We can make
use of nested concurrent actions to achieve this property, as indicated below.
(1) The process (say P) running the main program as a robust action on N1 forks a process, Q,
and waits.
(2) Process Q starts a new action and establishes a recovery point; it creates a server process,
W1, on N2 to receive remote calls for A.
(3) If a call to A fails then Q performs local recovery and aborts; P now continues.
(4) There are two possibilities at node N2: either N2 has crashed, in which case there is no W2,
or W2 is running.  If the latter is true, then W2 will eventually abort (see the algorithm for a
worker given in the previous subsection).
(5) Process P can fork another process to perform operations on object B.
We will gloss over the details of recovery data management for concurrent actions as they
are not essential to understand the point that concurrent actions can be aborted independent of the
enclosing action.  Naturally, the above idea can be applied to any degree of nesting of actions.
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Returning to our example, if the home node of the robust action (N1) crashes, then the entire
action will be aborted.  If this is not deemed desirable, then a distributed checkpointing facility
will be required so that the intermediate state of the entire computation can be saved on stable
storage.  We will not pursue this topic further here.
6.   Some Distributed Object–Based Systems
In this section we will briefly describe some prototype distributed systems that have been
either developed recently or are in the process of development.  All these systems make use of
robust objects and atomic actions to provide an environment for reliable distributed computing.
As yet, little operational experience is available to be able to make comparative evaluation of the
advantages and disadvantages of the various specific techniques employed in these systems.
6.1   Argus
Argus [Liskov and Scheifler 83] is a programming language and system designed at MIT
that supports the building of robust distributed programs.  In Argus, programs are implemented
out of one or more modules known as guardians.  Each guardian consists of data objects and
processes for manipulating those objects. An object is only allowed to belong to one guardian.
Objects within a guardian can be directly manipulated by processes internal to the guardian, but
not by other guardians.  Instead, access to these objects is provided by a set of handlers
(procedures) that can be called by other guardians.  Handler calls are remote procedure calls with
each call executing as a nested atomic action.  Furthermore, all parameter passing is by value
making it impossible to pass an object reference in a handler call.  A guardian resides at a single
site only and is crash–resistant.  If a guardian’s site crashes then all processes are lost but a subset
of the guardian’s objects (its stable state) survives and will be restored when the site recovers.
Argus provides a set of basic atomic data types such as arrays and records, as well as the
ability to construct user–defined atomic data types.  An action starts at one guardian but can
spread to others by making handler calls.  Language features have been provided for constructing
nested and concurrent actions.
6.2  ISIS
The ISIS [Birman 85] project from Cornell University aims to produce fault–tolerant
implementations of objects automatically from fault–intolerant program specifications.  The
resulting objects are then known as resilient (or more precisely, k–resilient) objects.  ISIS works
by replicating both the code and data of an object at least k+1 times, while ensuring that the
replicated program behaves exactly like a non–replicated program of the original specification.
Resilient objects are represented at a set of k+1 sites by components that are capable of executing
requests sent to them via remote procedure calls.  Each request is handled as a separate nested
atomic action.  The use of replication limits the requirements for stable storage since a failed
component can recover its state from any of the other operational components.  One component is
known as the coordinator, while the remaining components are known as cohorts.  It is the
coordinator who is responsible for executing the request and returning the result to both the caller
and all the cohorts.  If the coordinator fails one of the cohorts becomes the new coordinator and
processing of the request continues.  The individual components are statically ranked such that
the choice of which cohort becomes the new coordinator is easy to make.
Objects in ISIS exhibit the following properties:
(1) Consistency.  The external behaviour of a resilient object is identical to that exhibited by an
equivalent non–distributed object which executes requests serially and to completion with
no interleaving.
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(2) Availability. Providing that no more than k sites holding components of an object fail
simultaneously the other operational components of the object will continue to process
requests.
(3) Progress. Providing no more than k sites of a resilient object fail, operations on it are
executed to completion.
(4) Recovery. Failed components restart automatically.
ISIS is built on top of a communication layer that implements a set of broadcast facilities,
which provide a variety of guarantees about the order in which messages will be delivered.  A
failure detection mechanism is also integrated into this layer.  ISIS objects are coded in an
extended version of the C programming language.  The extensions allow internal concurrency,
together with atomic action control, remote procedure calls, and other facilities.
6.3   Profemo
The Profemo [Nett et al. 85] object–based distributed system aims to use specially designed
hardware to provide support for object access, storage, and atomic action management.  The
object space, the regions where objects or information about objects exist, is divided into four
distinct parts.  The active and recovery spaces exist in virtual memory, the former containing
objects in use by the system, the latter contains recovery information required to recover from
action failures.  The permanent and log spaces are implemented on stable storage to provide
tolerance against both site and media faults.  Objects held in the permanent space are effectively
filed, and may be used by both local and remote programs transparently.  The log space contains
information required to survive a site failure, and may contain newly committed objects which
will eventually be propagated to the permanent space.  The recovery and object management are
all supported by the operating system kernel to improve performance.
Support for nested atomic actions is also built into the kernel and is aided by dedicated
hardware.  Two phase locking is used, but the shrinking phase is not made instantaneous; objects
no longer required by an action may be released before the action terminates.  This has the
advantage of increasing possible concurrency, but the disadvantage of cascade roll back as
mentioned in Section 2.  In order to be able to determine the extent of cascade roll back required, it
is necessary to record dependencies between actions.  Such dependencies are maintained in a
recovery graph.  Profemo provides hardware support for recovery graph maintenance and for
other aspects of recovery management.
6.4   Arjuna
The goal of the Arjuna project is the development of a distributed object–based system for
programming with atomic actions.  The project exploits much of the work done at Newcastle on
reliability and distributed systems [Shrivastava 85].  In particular, it employs a previous RPC
design [Panzieri and Shrivastava] which has been modified to incorporate multicasting facilities,
and is using multicasting RPCs to implement commit protocols and manage replicated data.
Rather than provide a new language or operating system with support for robust objects and
actions, Arjuna is exploiting the type inheritance facility provided by the implementation
language, C++ [Stroustrup 86], to add both recoverability [Dixon and Shrivastava 87] and
concurrency control [Parrington and Shrivastava 87] to objects.  Nested atomic actions which use
these objects may be employed along with stub–generated RPC invocations to provide reliable
distributed computations.
Recoverable objects can be constructed out of both recoverable and unrecoverable objects.
Rather than provide an explicit recovery subsystem, the objects themselves are responsible for
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initiating the process of recording recovery information, and operate in conjunction with the
program which is using them.  The atomic action model is also being extended to allow the
possibility of long running actions (LRA) which release objects before the action is committed
[Shrivastava 82].  The system is being developed on top of the UNIX2 operating system.
7.   Concluding Remarks
The approach adopted by this paper was first to develop a framework for constructing
robust non–distributed programs and then to extend that  framework to encompass distributed
programs.  We have presented what may be termed an object based recovery approach, whereby
objects are responsible for implementing backward recovery and crash resistance.  A number of
object–based systems making use of the concepts reviewed here were discussed to indicate to the
reader the wide scope of activity in the field of reliable distributed computing.
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